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H ome ownership in China surged in the last few decades since the cessation of government housing provision based on welfare principles in 1998 and the subsequent marketization process (Huque, 2005; Ye & Wu, 2008; Dong, Christensen & Painter, 2010) . These reforms have given rise to a variety of governance issues in private urban neighborhoods, and correspondingly a number of local governing structures such as community-run nonprofit entities, social organizations and homeowner associations (Wang, 2008; Read, 2007; Liu, 2008) . Notable among these structures is the possibility of establishing homeowner associations (HOAs) (Yip, 2014) . Homeowners' right to establish HOAs is now safeguarded by the Property Rights Law enacted in 2007 (in particular Article 75 and 76). The law allows property owners of residential complexes to establish an HOA committee, elect its members, convene regular meetings, hire and control their property management firm, and manage affairs of their neighborhood. 1 This change in neighborhood governance presents excellent self-governing opportunities and correspondingly major challenges to the Chinese people (Chen, 2009) .
2 Ever since the founding of communist China, ordinary Chinese have been de facto "subjects" of the party-state, enjoying limited political and economic rights (Wang, Li & Cooper, 2015) . Despite the long history of self-governance among extended family members in many traditional villages of dynastic China (Fei, 2008 (Fei, /1947 , it is only recently that economic liberalization and administrative reforms have gradually transformed the post-revolutionary state-society relationship to a more equal one. This legally guaranteed right to form HOAs, and thus the right to assemble and collectively decide on private neighborhood matters, represents one major advancement in opportunities for political participation for the ordinary people.
Just as in many developing countries experiencing rapid modernization, China has observed a major tension between preserving traditional governing cultures and practices versus reforming them towards some modern, rational-legal arrangements (Commons, 2009 (Commons, /1925 . For one thing, many Chinese homeowners, as firsttime property buyers in the private market, may not be disposed to comprehend and accept the oftenambiguous boundaries between individual and shared property rights. Further, collective efforts and broadbased agreements are hard to formulate for managing their shared properties, given the general lack of efficacy and experience in civic deliberation, or sometimes simply the large number of homeowners they needed to organize. How did Chinese homeowners approach and seek to overcome various governing difficulties when realizing their new rights? Were their behaviors any different from those of other countries?
EXPERIENCES OF NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNANCE
The emergence of self-governing institutions in urban neighborhoods has attracted much scholarly attention in the last decade (for example, Webster, 2003; Baer & Feiock, 2005; Musso, Weare, Oztas & Loges, 2006; Farrelly & Sullivan, 2010) . The phenomenon has been considered a "constitutional revolution" (Nelson, 2005) , or the rise of "local federalism" (Fung & Wright, 2001; Box & Musso, 2004) .
3 Against worries about societal fragmentation with the development of gated communities, these scholars argue that participation in neighborhood governance fundamentally revitalizes people's democratic experience, as it usually involves careful deliberation and collective decisions among the people.
In China, however, the change in neighborhood governance follows a different trajectory. Unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese homeowners do not have much modern-democratic governing experience, and Western concepts such as modern citizenship and democratic principles are relatively new to them. Ever since the establishment of modern China, urban neighborhood affairs have been the responsibility of residential committees (RCs), instituted by the Chinese Communist Party and managed directly by Street Offices, the lowest, subdistrict-level government of China. Although they are supposed to be the venue in which "residents engage in 'self-administration, selfeducation, and self-service'", RCs now consist of not volunteers but "three to seven paid staff", with their main function being "fusing … government administration with local social networks"; they are to "facilitate … government programs" through "cultivating positive relations with those who are receptive to their work" and "us[ing] persuasion and social pressure to defuse any group demands by residents before these are taken out of the neighborhood and into the streets or onto the doorsteps of government agencies" (Read 2003, 37-38) . A predecessor of HOA may be found in 1994 when the Ministry of Construction announced that residents should form their own elected committees to select their property management company to manage their neighborhood. Yet residents were constrained heavily by local housing and other administrative agencies (e.g., the Ministry of Civil Affairs) with their oversight and subsequent stipulations. For example, a "preparatory group" (introduced in 2000) consisting of the developer, the management company, local government, and the police was required to establish these committees (Read 2003, 43-44) . In other words, for a lot of the Chinese people, this possibility of establishing and operating HOAs represents less of a revival of democratic experience than the first taste of self-organization for governing their neighborhoods in contemporary China.
Apart from homeowners' inexperience, their neighborhood governing efforts might also be hindered by their lack of understanding of the rights and the corresponding limits as property owners (Chen, 2009; Fu & Lin, 2014) . Major disputes often arose on the management of their jointly-owned properties. Individual homeowners might show little regard for others' rights to the communal properties, for example, knocking down a load-bearing wall to enlarge private space or taking over portions of the common garden space for personal use. They would also disagree with one another on how the HOA should be established, and how it should be operated if established. The norms and practices of deliberation and citizen participation have remained weakly developed. It has not been uncommon for individual homeowners to grow suspicious of other active homeowners. They would disagree on the usage of the communal fund, the choice of the best property management firm, or the meeting, election and decision procedures. Many also showed little respect for the authority of the HOA, refusing to pay the required management fees, or simply ignoring its decisions.
Challenges to their effort do not just come from the inside. Legally speaking, the establishment of an HOA requires an agreement of more than 1/2 of all the unit owners who collectively own more than 1/2 of the total area of the neighborhood. The sheer number of households needed to be mobilized before the establishment of HOAs is already a daunting challenge, especially for larger condominium projects. Moreover, developers might delay their establishment and thus the transfer of rights to hire and control property management firms when maintaining such control was profitable-Developers often generated additional revenue which they pocketed by leasing homeowners' parking spaces to local businesses and individual outsiders, their garden spaces for parties and weddings, or even the buildings' walls for advertising signs. When homeowners finally realized and complained about these practices, they were at best ignored, or at worst physically attacked by the security personnel of management firms hired by the developers. Local government authorities were not very helpful in a lot of these situations. In fact, homeowners often accused the street offices of colluding with local developers and property management firms. Local governments, meanwhile, might consider homeowners' efforts at organizing and complaining as "homeowner rebellion", disturbing the supposedly harmonious relationship between the state, market, and the people. Overall, the political environment has not been very conducive to the selfgoverning efforts of the homeowners.
In spite of all these challenges, some homeowners did manage to mobilize other neighborhood members and overcome various difficulties (albeit with a mixed degree of success) in their self-governing effort. For example, there were cases of civic actions such as picketing, freeway blocking, litigations in local courts, petitioning to higher authorities, sit-ins in government offices, and even of participating and campaigning in local government elections (Wang 2008, 22-23) . Most importantly, some neighborhoods did succeed in forming their HOA, as shown by its relatively reasonable establishment rate (Wang, Yin & Zhou, 2011) , and sustain their operation. How can one make sense of their persistent endeavors to neighborhood governance and explain their success given the unfavorable historical and political contexts? It is with these questions we review the various approaches to studying neighborhood governance in the literature.
APPROACHES IN NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNANCE STUDIES
In general, a neighborhood consists of privatelyowned residential units and shared neighborhood properties, such as gardens. The good governance of its communal features is fundamental to the wellbeing of its residents as well as its property owners. Depending on the situation, relevant actors usually involve individual residents, unit owners, developers, property management units, and sometimes government officials and offices of local districts.
The problems and difficulties in homeowners' neighborhood governance effort can be conceptualized as an ongoing series of collective action problems among the property owners (Olson, 1965; Chen & Webster, 2005) . According to Olson's theory of collective action (1965), members of a group, who are assumed to be rational self-interest maximizers, will not engage in organizing for collective actions unless their respective gain is larger than their private cost of organizing. A well-managed neighborhood (such as good neighborhood facilities and environment) is hard to attain, as it is easy for individual residents to free-ride on others for its production. A recent study of urban communities in Guangzhou, for example, highlighted the "hidden costs of civic engagement" as one major factor impeding homeowners' voluntary participation in neighborhood affairs (Fu & Lin, 2014) . It is especially so when its consumption is not readily excludable as unit owners are often entitled to roughly equal rights based on their share of ownership in the neighborhood. In a functioning property market, dissatisfied property owners may always try to sell their properties and move elsewhere, and a marketbased order is said to emerge from the exchange of neighborhood properties (Webster, 2003; Baer & Feiock, 2005) . Neighborhood governance thus may be seen as a nexus of contracts (Webster, 2003) , formed among the constitutive property owners based on their interests, private and public information about the property, as well as the transaction costs associated with the exchange.
From this perspective, the neighborhood may also be governed indirectly through some proxies; property owners may set up and utilize institutional structures such as neighborhood councils (organized voluntarily by the residents) or homeowner associations (organized by real estate developers based on written restrictions in title deeds), and through which property management companies may be hired to manage neighborhood affairs on behalf of the homeowners. Although mixed empirical evidence was found regarding their respective impacts, the successful establishment and operation of these governing structures usually increase the property value in the neighborhood (Scheller, 2015; Craw, 2017) , and their success depends largely on the property owners deriving agreements for efficient monitoring and accountability systems. Problems may arise if the owners fail to agree on the corresponding management rules and measures: for example, the selection criteria of representatives, the size of management fees, or the power to be assigned to the governing committee. As Craw (2017, 709) argues, neighborhoods governed by voluntary efforts may suit better the residents' interests, but without the help of some formal governance mechanisms (e.g., local codes and regulations), the high cost of organizing informally may undermine these efforts.
Since the last decade, more and more scholars have modified the rational actor assumption and proposed that the influence of social relationships should be considered in neighborhood governance (Box & Musso, 2004; Nelson, 2005; Musso, Weare, Oztas & Loges, 2006) . This perspective sees neighborhood governance as constituted by a nexus of social ties, in which individuals may develop various kinds of informal relationships with one another (e.g., kinship, friendship, ethnicity, acquaintance) (Chaskin, 1997) . Patterns in their organizing behaviors are then explained by some structural properties and configurations of these social networks (Weare, Lichterman & Esparza, 2014; Musso & Weare, 2006; Wang, 2015) 4 , as well as the social capital (e.g., mutual trust) accumulated in the neighborhood among the homeowners (Fu & Lin, 2014) . The perspective focuses on how neighborhood governance is understood through the nexus of embedded social relationships, which mediate people's interaction in the process (Granovetter, 1985) . The successful governing of the neighborhood depends on whether structural characteristics of the embedded social networks are conducive to some collective efforts required in neighborhood governance.
Individuals, under this perspective, may also create and sustain informal institutions for various neighborhood governing purposes (Ostrom, 2005; also Elster, 2015) . These institutions are enforced socially, sustained through such mechanisms as ostracism, shaming, reciprocity, and reputation (Nee, 2005) . They help govern who may manage the neighborhood, and how. For example, in some developing countries with weaker legal systems, informal institutions help residents demarcate each others' property, indicating their de facto ownership (de Soto, 2000) . Features such as face-to-face communication, smaller groups, and those with members of similar interests and resources are all conducive to the development of these institutions, which help induce cooperation and resolve collective action problems among the neighborhood members (Ostrom, 1998) .
Neighborhood Governance as a Nexus of Shared Meanings
The above perspectives, however, do not provide a full explanation regarding why property owners' have those preferences and why certain types of institutional arrangements and practices are pursued and more welcomed than others. To answer these questions, we propose an alternative perspective which takes into account the context of homeowners' embedded community (Ostrom, 2005) and sees neighborhood governance as constituted of a nexus of shared meanings.
Social actions inherently carry meanings (Weber, 1978) . A view commonly shared by interpretive theorists (Bevir, 2012) is that individuals do not live in a vacuum but in a "web of significance" which they have spun (Geertz, 1973) . These meanings influence actions and are also sustained by them. To understand human behaviors, the meanings behind people's actions needs to be understood. Generally speaking, meanings are constructed as people assign their subjective conceptions to things such as objects, events, and experiences. Meanings may be recognized and remembered; they may also be shared and transferred as they are expressed, communicated, negotiated and/or contested. Meanings are often manifested in people's narratives, or stories, as distinctions, categories, and logics (Patterson & Monroe, 1998) . As people develop more complicated relationships with and among these concepts, the web of meanings can become very entangled and complicated, to the extent that people may simply take them for granted as social facts (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) .
Studies have adopted this interpretive approach to understanding neighborhood-related phenomena (Glover, 2004; Campbell, Henly, Elliott & Irwin, 2009) . Applying it specifically to neighborhood governance, the perspective suggests that the multiplex conceptions and associations homeowners had regarding their neighborhood and its governance constitute their diverse attitudes and behaviors. On the one hand, these meanings may be assigned individually by the homeowners to their governing actions, and/ or expressed and become shared as neighborhood members communicate with one another. On the other hand, despite the apparent autonomy, their assignment of meanings is often conditioned culturally and historically. Communities experienced common historical events or sharing similar cultural traditions tend to assign comparable meanings to make sense of and discuss various governance matters (Bevir, 2013) . These shared meanings serve as the basis for dialogues and potential consensus on neighborhood governing matters. For researchers who are interested in explaining neighborhood governance, it is essential to go beyond considerations of individual interests and incentives, or the embedded social network and associated capital and norm, to their embedded meaning contexts underlying their interests and social relationships, as well as the institutional structures and practices pursued and adopted in the governing process.
THE RELEVANCE OF CONFUCIAN IDEAS
To understand better Chinese homeowners' endeavor to neighborhood governance and overcoming various collective action challenges in the process, we looked into the self-narratives of these homeowners-how they described themselves and their involvement in neighborhood governance. As an exploratory study, we drew our data from residential neighborhoods in Beijing. Beijing has been the capital of China both before and after the revolution for more than half a millennium. Arguably the influence it received from a major traditional culture, Confucianism, should be one of the most salient; Beijing should be a good litmus test for exploring the utility of our proposed perspective that focuses on shared meanings in neighborhood governance.
Confucianism has been a strong source of cultural influence in China. The classical texts of Confucianism have been held in high regard by generations of scholars. The Analects, and Daxue, together with the Mencius and Zhongyong were mandated since the Song dynasty to be the four required texts for the national public service examinations until the end of imperial China. There were hiatuses in the promotion of Confucianism in the 20th Century. It was bitterly criticized at the time around the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and during the Cultural Revolution (Solé-Farràs, 2013; Wu, 2014 ). Yet its influence continues. Zuo and Benford (1995) in their study of the student democratic movement in 1989, for example, found that one strategy students used in the mobilization process was aligning the movement frames with some later variations of Confucianism.
5 (This showed that, at least among the movement participants, Confucian ideas such as a sense of responsibility and self-sacrifice still resonated strongly in post-imperial China. More recently, Confucianism is experiencing a revival, in part due to the sponsorship by the Communist government, which sees Confucianism as a critical moral resource to promote social responsibility and stability. The revival has been attributed to the fact that people are turning to traditional ideas in order to find meanings and peace in response to the anxiety and atomism brought by fast economic modernization in the past three decades (Bell, 2014; Wu, 2014) .
A brief discussion of Confuciansim as a school of thought is warranted here. Confucianism emphasizes the importance of cultivating personal virtue (de 德). Despite its many variations and later development, Confucianism regards individuals with noble virtue as "nobleman" (junzi 君子). While it is commonly known that the major virtue of a nobleman is compassion (ren 仁), another major virtue is yi (義). Yi may be broadly translated as "righteousness (or justice)", and is in contrast with "interest" (li 利) (Yu, 2010a (Yu, /1987 Lau 1983) . 6 The distinction between righteousness and interest runs parallel with the distinction between "public (or common)" (gong 公) and "private" (si 私) (Yu, 2010a (Yu, /1987 . According to The Book of Rites (Li Ji 禮記), "When the Grand course was pursued, 'a public and common spirit ruled all under the sky' (tianxia wei gong 天下為公) (Li Yun 1)".
7 Affairs of the public are considered the task of noblemen; In other words, nobelmen are expected to contribute to what is public and righteous, and not what is private and interest-related.
Note here that the social unit of "family" plays a significant role in the cultivation of personal virtue, and one's path to become a nobleman. Daxue, another Confucian classic, proposes that "The Way of The Great Learning" (daxue zhi dao 大學之道) is to manifest luminous virtue and stop only at the "ultimate goodness". It discusses in detail the path that a nobleman should follow in his pursuit of The Way (Johnston & Wang, 2012, 135 This idea bridges two main goals of Confucianism: "inner saint" (neisheng 內聖) with "outer merit/ benevolence" (waiwan 外王), or noble virtues in the private realm with good deeds in the public realm (Yu, 2010b, 22) . The passage advises one to start with perfecting his character and knowledge in the private realm, continue with cultivating his inner virtue, managing well his family and country, and eventually contributing himself to the world. Overall, the text describes what a nobleman's ultimate life goal should be, and details practical guidelines on how this ideal can be achieved (Yu, 2010b) .
5 For instance, "tianxia xingwang / pifu youze" (天下興亡／匹夫有責, every individual is responsible for the rise and fall of the world). 6 A comprehensive online source of Chinese literature, ctext.org, translates the paragraph as "The Master said, 'The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain.'" Available online at http://ctext.org/analects/li-ren. Last accessed 15 February 2015. 7 Available online at http://ctext.org/liji/li-yun. Last accessed 15 February 2015. 6 We adopt Zhuxi's interpretation here for convenience.
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODS
Would traces of major Confucian ideas such as the above be found to inform contemporary Chinese homeowners' neighborhood governance behaviors? The study collected its empirical evidence in 2013 by conducting semi-structured interviews with past and current organizers of homeowner associations in Beijing. Structured questions were asked to understand why they joined in organizing the homeowners in their neighborhoods in the first place and to elicit their thoughts and experience in the process; Open-ended questions were also raised during the interviews to stimulate deeper dialogues (see Appendix). Our collaborators in Beijing, a nonprofit organization which specialized in homeowners' advocacy, helped arrange the first set of interviews with past or current HOA organizers from six different neighborhoods. We then adopted a snowball sampling approach by asking these interviewees to introduce us to HOA organizers from other neighborhoods. Each interview lasted for 2-3 hours. The interviews took two forms: one-onone interviews and focus group discussions. We had seven focus groups, each of which had a number of homeowners. The group discussions created rapport and synergy among the interviewees, which gave us some in-depth knowledge about their thoughts and experiences. We stopped at the point of data saturation when we felt that we repeatedly came across similar information. In the end, our sample included 27 homeowners from 16 different neighborhoods. While the literature tends to conduct field observations to examine the dynamics of homeowners interacting with one another in the organizing process (e.g., O'Brien & Li, 2006; Zhu, 2011), our focus on their self-narratives allows the interviewees to take a step back from the often-contentious negotiating process, and reflect deeply upon the motivations of their behaviors, the rationales behind their concerns and arguments, and more generally their roles in the process. It fits our purpose of uncovering the meanings they ascribed to themselves and their involvement, the knowledge of which, as argued above, provides a deeper understanding of the cultural and historical contexts underlying the neighborhood governing process. We analyzed the data with the constant comparative method (Glaser, 1965) . Facilitated by the software NVivo 10, the data analysis started with open coding, which gave us some initial categories. We next formulated some working hypotheses that linked some of these categories. The working hypotheses were then tested further. Those that withstood the tests were kept and became the major arguments of this paper, as presented below.
FINDINGS

Progression from Individual through Neighborhood to Country
Our interviewees often considered their involvement in neighborhood affairs as part of their contribution to the country. They felt that their work in the neighborhood would promote the country's development. The association seemed so natural that it was often mentioned without much supportive reasoning. We contended that this association might find its root in one strain of Confucianism: virtuous individuals should cultivate themselves, regulate their households, and then contribute to the good order of their states. Such an ethical idea imbued a special responsibility to the homeowners, motivating them to look beyond immediate personal interests.
For example, one organizer (B), who graduated from a top Chinese university and worked as a journalist and a teacher before, described how he first realized the broader implications of his effort in organizing homeowners. He saw that his behavior could have important consequences for both "China" and "Chinese society":
When To him, the training of homeowners in other neighborhoods was not just about helping them protect their property rights. It was part of a larger effort to actualize the inescapable obligation to themselves and the country.
Another homeowner, (E), saw organizing homeowners as a contribution to a more civil and democratic society:
I think this [organizing homeowners] is a foundation of the Chinese society. Why cannot we make democracy work in Chinese society? It is because this foundation is not good. It is difficult to organize ordinary people, and they don't even know how to have meetings [to discuss public affairs] as well as how to protect their interests.
The frequent appearance of this "individual-country" association invites further interpretation. The leap from personal behavior to its implications for China may sound abrupt logically, if not pretentious, to some readers, but it makes sense if we see it from the Confucian perspective. As discussed above, Confucianism expects virtuous individuals to not only perfect their private behaviors but also contribute to the good order of the state. The "individual-country" link mirrors the sequence from "regulating households" to "bringing order to states" in Confucianism. As homeowners saw their work in the neighborhood as part of their inescapable responsibility to the society, they devoted more time and energy to homeowner organizing.
Some homeowners elaborated this linkage in more detail. A female HOA organizer (A3) explained how "natural" it was to progress from taking care of one's household affairs to community affairs when commenting on women's participation in neighborhood affairs: In another case, such an "individual-country" relation even served to legitimize their behavior. The neighborhood of homeowner C1 faced some unfavorable conditions, mentioned above, in setting up the HOA, and the homeowners encountered some government officials who thought that their effort was "revolting against the government". She defended their behaviors as part of the effort in "perfecting" national development.
Actually, from a macro perspective, our establishment of a homeowners association is for perfecting "country-family (or national)" (guojia 國家) construction. But during the process, government officials thought that we were revolting against the government, picking on their problems. They have the wrong idea. In fact, she even went on to develop a more comprehensive conception of citizenship and evaluate the government officials against it accordingly: I think they [homeowners] 
Our homeowners have not even given us any money!
From our perspective, this Confucian idea of social responsibility not only constituted their neighborhood involvement but also helped them counter government officials' frame of "homeowner rebellion". It conferred legitimacy to their behavior, allowing them to stand against political obstruction and continue with their action.
Sharp distinction between public and private Our interviews also found that homeowners associated special meanings with the concepts of "public" (gong 公) and "private" (si 私). They classified and evaluated their own as well as other homeowners' behaviors against a norm that distinguished strictly between the two concepts; an effort that might be suspected as serving private gains was detested and severely criticized. To many interviewees, organizing for the neighborhood represented a service to the "public". The term "public" often had a positive connotation. Homeowner B, for example, described himself as "public-spirited" and had a "public personality" when explaining why he started organizing homeowners for his neighborhood:
I On the other hand, those who did not contribute were seen as focusing only on "small" (private) "personal interests", which carried clearly a negative connotation. Homeowner K commented that:
Not many people think about this matter of selfgoverning. So their general behavior is "don't care, don't participate". Even for those whose personal interests have been infringed upon, they just "open one eye and close one eye ... [It is] the "bad-nature" (liegenxing 劣根性) of Chinese people who focus on small personal interests (xiao li 小利).
It was widely reported that in order to garner trust and support from other homeowners, one's motive had to be related mostly, if not completely, to "public". For instance, when homeowner C1 was trying to garner others' support in the neighborhood, she described the establishment of HOA as a "public-beneficial" (gongyi 公益) event that required strong dedication:
The other day we were saying why [we failed] to establish our homeowners' association. And I said establishing homeowners' association is a "public-beneficial" (gongyi 公益) event. One has to dedicate oneself, dedicate his efforts and financial resources.
Homeowner K also reported with pride that no one in his team carried with them a "private-heart" (sixin 私 心):
We all work in accordance with the regulations. We hold ourselves to a high standard. And in our team no one brings in his "private-heart" (sixin 私心), so we are very united.
Organizing effort might be criticized for serving "private" interests. As reported, homeowner M complained about her experiences with local governments. The officials were suspicious of their motives and criticized them as having in it "privateinterest":
We had a big headache when dealing with the Street Office. There are all kinds of problems at the lower level of the government ... These people are very bureaucratic. When you initiate to establish a homeowners association, they will first assume that you are serving "privateinterest" (sili 私利).
Many homeowners did admit to us that their participation served both personal and public interests. Yet the normative expectation of benefiting the public was so strong that they felt obliged to justify to themselves as to why their motives were not purely public. One homeowner (M) explained her "halfpublic-beneficial" motive at length: Overall, normative disapprovals of the pursuits of "private"-ness were expressed in a variety of forms, such as "self-private (or selfish)" (zisi 自私), "privateinterest" (sili 私利), "private-heart (or with motives of private interest)" (sixin 私心). Such an expectation was widely shared among the interviewed homeowners. The limitation of this paper is that the RICF only has project information for foundations for the year 2014. The statistical analyses can be improved by using panel data when it becomes available in the near future. More data of RICF is scheduled to be released dating back to 2008. When panel data is available, time series analysis will be possible and should be more powerful in examining the research questions.
DISCUSSION
Our empirical investigation found some common distinctions and associations shared among the homeowners in their neighborhood governing efforts through HOAs. HOA organizers were normatively expected to serve with purely "public" motives and renounce "private" ones, whereas neighborhood management was not merely seen as a means for improving living conditions, but a patriotic act of serving the country. These shared meanings corresponded to the ideal of junzi in Confucianism as well as its guide to moral cultivation: virtuous individuals are expected to pursue public-righteousness instead of private-interest, and they are to pursue the "ultimate goodness" by progressing from one's personal self to one's family and country and eventually to the world.
The findings suggest important implications for future research. Existing literature has largely conceived neighborhood governance as constituted of nexuses of contracts or social ties. Both perspectives nevertheless beg further questions: What shapes homeowners' interests, as well as their creation of a social network and the accumulation of social capital? What determines the acceptability of certain institutional arrangements and practices in neighborhood governance? Our analysis provides initial answers to these questions. It shows that neighborhood governance does not take place in a meaning vacuum-the role of the participants, their acts, and the created governance structures, as well as the neighborhood itself, may all be imbued with rich meanings that are sustained and negotiated in the process. These related meanings constitute people's interests, expectations, and their involvement in neighborhood governance. These findings contribute to Ostrom's (2005) Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework by elaborating how "attributes of community" (the meaning context of Confucian ideas) may influence individuals' collective governing effort (for their neighborhoods). Our study also answers the recent call for a decentered theory of governance (Bevir, 2013) , which views governing institutions as practices embedded in the cultural and historical contexts of the actors involved (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010) .
For sure, there may be other potentially influential ideas in our empirical setting (Cai & Sheng, 2013) . Beijing has been the political, economic, and cultural capital of China before and after the revolution for more than half a millennium and Confucianism was the core ruling ideology for roughly the same period. However, one should still remain open to the potential influence of other ideas. For example, the Communist ideological emphasis on public service might have reinforced our interviewees' beliefs. Our interview records also indicated, perhaps due to the economic liberalization in the past three decades, some influence of the market logic: A few homeowners demanded better treatment from the developers with the reason that they were the latter's "customers". Professional identities, contemporary pop culture, as well as other philosophical-cultural-political ideas such as Daoism and Buddhism may also influence the homeowners. What is important is that some intersubjectively shared as a contemporary expression of some of the deepest streams of Confucian thought. Also, the findings might behoove the Chinese government to seek a more dynamic equilibrium as an appropriate form of societal stability than a static, carefully controlled type of stability. Such a dynamic stability is more consistent with contemporary expressions of tradition which accept gradual change but remain resistant to radical deviations. It is more like the motion of a boat on the sea rolling, pitching, and yawing with waves and currents without sinking, being capsized, or losing its direction. Any boat that might be able to maintain static stability in a rolling sea would soon sink.
Finally, our analysis may contribute to the recent proposal of developing endogenous citizenship ethics for contemporary China (Heberer, 2009) . It demonstrates how core Confucian ideas remain deeply ingrained in people's conceptions, influencing their attitudes and behaviors in situations they consider "public". It also echoes recent empirical research on what constitutes "public" and what values are desired in public affairs (Jørgensen & Rutgers, 2015) . Policy makers and public managers should consider if the assumptions underlying their policies and expectations are consistent (enough) with the meaning-nexus shared by relevant policy actors and members of the wider society. Chinese people involved in civic engagement movements might also consider explaining their objectives and justifications for actions in terms of certain strains of Confucian thought instead of necessarily referring to ideas rooted in Western political traditions.
CONCLUSION
Until recently, economic development had been dominating the developmental agenda in China since Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Up Policy. The rapid process of development has caused devastating disruption to China's indigenous cultures and the fabric of many existing communities. The possibility of establishing HOAs and allowing local people to govern their neigborhoods presents an encouraging opportunity to rectify such a trend. However, self-organizing for governance is difficult, meanings are embedded in the homeowners' narratives and constitutive of their involvement in neighborhood affairs. Further research is warranted to investigate the roles of various culturally and historically embedded ideas in shaping people's behaviors and their accepted practices in contemporary neighborhood governance.
Our findings also complement recent discussion on the impacts of participation on citizenship development in China (Wang, Li & Cooper, 2015; Wang & Dai, 2012) as well as specifically the argument that HOAs provide a good arena for citizenship development (Read, 2003) . Thus far, the literature has been arguing from a capacity building perceptive that citizen participation is a good training ground for citizenship and democracy (De Tocqueville, 1840) , and that a key to citizenship cultivation is education (Cooper, 1991; Stivers, 2001) . One important remaining question is that whether the participants also see that what they are doing embodies the values of democracy and modern rights-based citizenship. This concern is similar to the debate about whether the "rightful resistance" activities in China (O'Brien & Li, 2006) represent "growing rights consciousness or a rules consciousness that has existed for centuries" (O'Brien, 2013 (O'Brien, , 1059 Perry, 2008; Zhu, 2011) . From our perspective, efforts in neighborhood governing, to some, may simply be about serving the instrumental purposes of improving their own living conditions and/or the market price of their apartments (which may not be very different from some corporate board members deliberating for company profits). But interestingly, our results showed that at least in Beijing, or perhaps other areas receiving strong influence from Confucianism, some people did share similar understanding about neighborhood governance and consider their corresponding efforts as carrying significant implications for the country. While more empirical research is needed to confirm these initial findings, relevant legislators and government agencies should probably take these potential associations into consideration. Peoples' self-governance impulses, such as those emerging from the HOA movement, should not be perceived as necessarily a result of foreign influences; roots of these impulses may be found in ancient Chinese traditions and understood and it is even more so in China as ordinary Chinese people generally lack such experience and have limited political and economic rights. Whether they can overcome the challenges and materialize this opportunity remains an open question. Our findings demonstrate how traditional Confucian ideas might have driven and guided homeowners' self-organizing effort for governing their neighborhoods. Seeing neighborhood governance as constituted of a nexus of shared meanings, our analysis shows alternative ways for conceiving urban policies that are more conducive to the revival of indigenous governing understandings and practices in China. While further ethnographic research is warranted, our analysis provides important lessons for the nation's reforming governance.
